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PREFACE 
Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) do not usually take a preeminent role in technical 
research projects. Sister projects arise as part of Horizon 2020 Framework Programme as a 
way to address this historical constraint and to allow SSH make a meaningful contribution to 
the shaping of the research agenda. To this regard, Sister projects are created to go beside 
the mainstream research in order to challenge existing biases in the research agendas and 
trying out more daring alternatives through the widening of imaginaries and by taking into 
account the SSH perspective. 
CIFRA, as a Sister project, does not take the current status quo in the ICT patent ecosystem 
for granted, but on the contrary, explores the impact that potential new framings could 
have in ICT innovation and the value they could provide to the society. 
Moreover, CIFRA project has addressed the ICT Patent ecosystem from the perspective of 
the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI), thus with the aim of determining the way it 
can be better aligned with the values, needs and expectations of society. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Based on surveys carried out in 1994 with R&D laboratories of about 1500 firms in 
manufacturing industries, Cohen et al. (2000) reported that companies relied most heavily 
on secrecy and lead times, and to a much lesser extent on patenting. Since then patent 
propensity has exploded. Indeed, the number of patent applications has increased steadily 
across the last 10 years in all major jurisdictions. For instance, from 2006 until 2015, patent 
applications at the USPTO and EPO increased by 50% and 20% reaching 589000 and 160000, 
respectively (although patent applications have stagnated in Europe in the last five years). 
The growth of applications at the Chinese Patent Office is even more dramatic with over 1 
million patents filed in 2015 and nearly 300000 granted. 
The information and communication technologies (ICT) sector displays even more 
pronounced propensities toward patenting.  Based on data covering 13 OECD economies, 
Fink et al. (2013) show that patenting propensities in ICT continued to climb during the 
2000s. Fink et al. (2013) also show that the relative increase in patent filings in ICT is partly 
due to an extremely fast growth in filings on digital communication technologies. Eberhardt 
et al. (2016) attribute most of the surge in patenting activity at the Chinese Patent Office to 
the filings of a small number of firms that operate in the ICT sector. 
While a naïve interpretation of these trends might conclude that the ICT sector is healthy 
and innovative, a proliferation of patent rights might have some deleterious consequences. 
Take, for instance, smartphones that require licenses of hundreds or even thousands of 
patents that, in most cases, have fuzzy boundaries (Biddle, White and Woods, 2010). This 
creates a complex interdependency scenario in which exclusion rights involving a scarce 
resource, such as those arising from patents, hinders the availability of technology (Heller, 
1998). In fact, patents become powerful tools to stop the implementation of the technology 
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instead of promoting it. This has brought in an escalation in the filings and the legal costs of 
patent enforcement, often associated with ‘Patent Wars’, as well as other strategic 
reactions like moving to countries with weaker intellectual property rights regimes (Paik and 
Zhu, 2016). 
Another important consequence is associated with the proliferation of patent applications 
and the fragmentation of the patent landscape. Overloaded with patent applications, patent 
offices might relax their quality checks and/or delay their granting decisions. Lower quality 
patents and longer patent lags make the patent landscape even more complex for 
companies and thus contribute to additional fragmentation and uncertainty, as property 
rights are not clear to the different players. Longer lags have also important implications for 
those companies that want to license their intellectual property. Gans, Hsu and Stern (2008) 
show that the probability of achieving a cooperative licensing agreement significantly 
increases in the aftermath of a patent allowance, as the allowance removes the uncertainty 
regarding the intellectual property that is negotiated. Farre-Mensa et al. (2016) find that 
each year delay in reviewing a firm’s first patent application that is eventually approved 
reduces the firm’s employment and sales growth over the five years following approval by 
21 and 28 percentage points, respectively. 
In this paper, we explore the correlation between measures associated with excessive 
patent fragmentation/proliferation and patent lags (from application to grant) in the ICT 
industry during the period 1990-2012. Our results are not to be interpreted as causal effects 
of firm characteristics on patent delays, but rather as descriptive evidence of correlations 
between patent applicants’ characteristics and the time from patent applications to patent 
grant.  
Among the different intellectual property rights, the CIFRA project chose to focus on patents 
because patents are particularly relevant in ICT. Moreover, as explained above, their use has 
increased dramatically in the last few years. We acknowledge upfront that findings might 
not be generalizable to other IPRs or industrial contexts. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 provides a literature review of the main drawbacks associated with excessive 
patenting in ICT. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and 
provides an overview of the trends of patenting within the ICT industry. Section 5 explores 
more in detail the correlation between patent lags and several measures of fragmentation 
and patent proliferation. Section 6 offers some conclusive remarks. 
2 DRAWBACKS OF EXCESSIVE PATENTING 
2.1 FRAGMENTATION OF IPRS  
The ICT industry is characterized by an overall increase in the level of technological 
complexity and the convergence of different technological domains (Gauch and Blind, 2015). 
In addition, the need for interoperability and interconnectivity of different technologies and 
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devices to combine them into single products and services creates demand for technological 
standards that promote compatibility (David and Greenstein, 1990). This has created a 
proliferation of patents and a fragmentation of the patent landscape, with increased 
incentives to patent strategically (Berger et al., 2012, Kang and Bekkers, 2015). This trend 
has produced a number of different problems including patent thickets, patent wars and 
underinvestment in innovation.  
Patent thickets arise when different patent owners hold complementary patents (Shapiro 
2001). This kind of situation is problematic because it can create the conditions for which 
companies may block each other’s use of the technology protected by the intricate set of 
patent claims. When technologies are particularly complex, like in the ICT sector, the 
likelihood that firms will experience patent thickets is higher (Von Graevenitz, Wagner, and 
Harhoff, 2011). Patent thickets are associated with increased transaction costs for 
companies. Patent thickets have far-reaching consequences. Cockburn and MacGarvie 
(2011) show that the presence of patent thickets (as proxied by patent density in a market) 
is negatively associated with the choice of entry to a given product market.  A recent study 
of the impact of patent thickets in the UK (Hall, Helmers and von Graevenitz, 2017) shows 
that they raise entry costs, which leads to less entry into technologies regardless of a firm’s 
size. 
Patent wars are likely to erupt whenever the expected payoff from offensive actions aimed 
at dominating the technological field exceeds the expected payoff from cooperation with 
other industry players (Somaya, 2003). Such behaviors are mostly witnessed in industries 
built around platforms or standards (e.g. the smartphone industry), where one or few major 
players quickly become dominant (Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012). In 
industries presenting such high strategic stakes, cooperation mechanisms are likely to break 
down in the early stages of industry development (Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001) and patent 
owners are more likely to aggressively defend their patent rights against competitors.  
The fragmentation of the patent landscape that characterizes the ICT industry is especially 
problematic because of its detrimental effects on the incentives for developing innovations. 
Thumm (2005) finds evidence that the presence of blocking patents at times impedes the 
development of medical tests. Likewise Arundel and Patel (2003) report that 16% of the 
firms included in their study declared that they had to abandon research projects because of 
patents held by competitors. Based on a large-scale survey conducted with inventors in USA, 
Europe and Japan, Torrisi et al. (2016) report that about 40% of patents remained unused by 
their owners, and about 67% of patent applications were filed to block other patents. Even 
when fragmentation does not oblige companies to abandon R&D projects, it frequently 
forces them to engage in some sort of copying mechanism, such as taking legal actions to 
limit the IP held by others or acquiring additional IP rights (Mueller, et al., 2013).  
2.2 LITIGATION COSTS: LACK OF FREEDOM TO OPERATE 
Patent litigation is a topic of extreme relevance for scholars, industry players and policy 
makers. According to a PWC report (2016), the total number of patent litigations in the US 
has been growing since 1991 at a 6.7% Compounded Annual Growth Rate to a total of more 
than 5600 cases in 2015. The growth rate is higher than the corresponding growth rate in 
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patents granted, which over the same time-span has been equal to 4.9%. Not surprisingly, 
this trend has produced an increase in the amount of time it takes to judicial courts to 
process patent cases. According to the same report, the median time-to-trial for the period 
1996-2000 was less than a year, while the figure for the 2011-2015 period is more than two 
and a half years. Beyond the US, patent litigation has been increasing in the rest of the 
world, with at least 250 cases of patent litigation being reported in the past 5 years.1 In 
countries with patent-owner friendly systems, like Germany and China, infringement of a 
patent, and the validity of a patent need to be determined at two different courts. 
Furthermore, patent owners have high win rates in these countries, so patent litigation 
cases may continue to rise.  
Patent litigations represent a heavy financial burden for firms and do not create any value 
for the society. Bessen and Meurer (2008) estimated that on average firms spend in patent 
litigation an amount equal to 14% of their total budget for research and development.  
Moreover, to prevent potentially destructive legal lawsuits, firms are at times forced to take 
drastic and costly actions. For example, the multi-billion dollar acquisition of Motorola by 
Google was mainly conducted to avoid lawsuits from Apple and Microsoft. The value of 
Motorola for Google in fact stemmed from the possibility of using the patent portfolio of 
Motorola to sue back Apple and Microsoft in case this would have been necessary. A recent 
paper by Mezzanotti (2016) shows that patent litigation reduces investment in innovation 
by lowering the returns from R&D and by exacerbating financing constraints.  
With millions of active patents and hundreds of thousands new patents filed for every year, 
it is difficult for any single firm to keep up with the state-of-the-art, especially in fast moving 
industries (Lemley and Feldman, 2016). These authors note that the majority of patent 
lawsuits are now filed by non-practicing entities. According to a recent study using event 
study method to look at cumulative abnormal returns around the time when non-practicing 
entities file for patent lawsuits, non-practicing entities may have caused the loss of half a 
trillion dollars in market value between 1990-2008 period (Bessen et al., 2011). Moreover, 
this represents a huge loss in R&D incentives and in social welfare as only a small amount of 
money transferred from the sued parties ends up in the non-practicing entity.  
2.3 HIGH (LEGAL) UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING PRIOR ART AND GRANTING 
More recently economic and legal scholars have begun to look at patents in a probabilistic 
sense (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005; Shapiro, 2003).  According to this view patents do not 
confer to their holders the right to exclude others from the unauthorized use of the 
innovation, but rather a right to try to exclude by asserting the patent in court.  
Part of the reasons behind this increase in uncertainty can be traced back to the process 
through which patents are granted. The USPTO, for example, requires the patent applicants 
to disclose the relevant prior art of which he/she is aware of, but not to conduct an 
exhaustive search of all the prior patents that are related to the invention. As a result, the 
USPTO is frequently criticized for missing relevant prior art and thus improperly issuing 
patents (e.g. Lemley, 2001). As patent proliferation has become an issue over the last years, 
                                                          
1 The Rise of Non-Practicing Entity (NPE) Cases Outside the United States. Accessed on 02/04/2017. Available 
at: http://www.darts-ip.com/the-rise-of-non-practicing-entity-npe-cases-outside-the-united-states/ 
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patent offices around the world have been focusing on quality. As way of example, the so-
called EPO “Raising the bar on patent quality” program (EPO annual report, 2007) aimed at 
achieving better patent applications from the onset.2   
Furthermore, the problem of high legal uncertainty is complicated by three tendencies. The 
first is the expansion of the patentable subject matters over time (Gallini, 2002; Kortum and 
Lerner, 1999). In the United States for instance, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
included software to the list of patentable inventions in the 1980s and 1990s, and business 
methods in 1998. The second is the relaxation of the principle that an invention must be 
non-obvious and contribute non-trivially to prior knowledge in order to be granted a patent 
(Merges, 1992). For some technology areas this principle has been relaxed to a point where 
a large number of patents of dubious validity has been granted (Barton, 2003; Jaffe, 2000) 
thereby increasing the chance that a given invention will infringe one or more existing 
patents and hence, lead to litigation. The third is a general propensity of inventors to file 
patent applications in areas of technology that historically have not been patentable 
(Lerner, 2002).3  
2.4 PATENT DELAYS 
Patent delay indicates the time that elapsed between the date in which a patent is filed (an 
application) and the date in which the patent is granted by the patent office. Detailed 
evidence of how patent delays have changed across years and how they vary across subject 
matters and jurisdictions is not available. However, a few studies have shown that patent 
delays are an increasingly important phenomenon. There is also scattered evidence about 
the determinants of patent delays. There is evidence showing that well-documented 
applications and those referred to patents with higher value are approved faster by the EPO 
and are withdrawn more slowly by the applicant (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009). Based on a 
longitudinal study of patents on genetically modified crops in the US, Regibeau and Rockett 
(2010) find that examination delay decreases as the patent office examines more patent 
applications in a technology class, and that the review delay is shorter for more important 
patent applications (i.e. patents that receive more citations) when the date of filing is 
controlled for. 
Delays in patent allowance have far-reaching consequences, as the intellectual property 
rights associated with a patent are not tradable before the patent is granted. Delayed 
patent allowances have been associated with a lower probability to license the patented 
technology, reduced employment by firms and reduced sales growth (Gans, Hsu and Stern 
2008; Farre-Mensa et al. 2016). 
                                                          
2 https://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/annual-report/2007/focus.html 
3 Recently, a new phenomenon has appeared in patent strategies: the extensive use of divisional applications 
and continuations (Link: https://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2013/20131018.html). These applications 
benefit from early priority dates that can effectively target alleged infringing products, long after these 
products have been introduced in the market. Many advocated that patents should not be allowed to be 
drafted ex post. To that end, the EPO unsuccessfully attempted to limit the time that divisional could be filed. 
So, the practice of allowing products to flood the market, target the future patent to the already known 
product has not been limited yet. 
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2.5 PATENT QUALITY 
A report by the OECD (Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2011) finds that patent 
quality has declined by an average of around 20 percent between the 1990s and 2000s, a 
pattern seen in nearly all countries studied. Patents of low quality should not be granted by 
the patent offices as they protect trivial innovations, offer very uncertain claims, infringe 
other patents, cover non-patentable subject matter, etc.  
Empirically, it is difficult to measure patent quality and, in most cases, patent quality has 
been equated to patent value. The latter has been measured with patent citations 
(Trajtenberg, 1990), the number of countries where the patent is applied for, how long a 
patent is renewed for (Lanjouw et al., 1998), the number of claims in the patent application 
(Tong and Frame, 1994), an index made up of number of claims, forward citations to the 
patent, backward citations in the patent application, and family size (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004). A more recent assessment of patent quality indicators across countries 
and technology fields, compares three composite indicators based on an equal weighting 
but different combinations of indices on patent scope, patent family size, patent grant lags, 
backward citations, citations to non-patent literature, claims, forward citations, 
breakthrough inventions, generality, originality, radicalness and patent renewal (Squicciarini 
et al., 2013). These efforts underscore the fact that measuring patent quality has been a 
consistent challenge for scholars working on innovation strategy. 
3 DATA  
The data used in this study is based on the European Patent Office (EPO) data of the CRIOS-
PatStat database. Researchers at the Invernizzi Center for Research on Organization and 
Strategy of Bocconi University use the raw data from Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
(PatStat) released by EPO, and process the data to associate patent applications with other 
information on inventors. This cleaning activity consists of the disambiguation of inventors 
and applicants, as well the normalization and reclassification of technology classes, which 
allow for easier statistical analyses. A description of the history, disambiguation procedures, 
and the access rules to the separate tables of the data used in putting together the CRIOS-
PatStat database can be found in Coffano and Tarasconi (2014).  
The current version of the database allows tracing patent applications made by companies 
over time and has data on patent applications between 1978 to 2014. However, patent 
offices are subject to large patent application backlogs, with 888,000 patents waiting to be 
examined at United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), compared to 340,000 
patent applications waiting to be examined at the EPO as of 2008 (Mejer and de la Potterie, 
2011).4 Besides the backlog issue for patents that are still under examination within the 
                                                          
4 While discussing the reason for these backlogs based on descriptive evidence, these authors suggest that the 
larger backlog at USPTO is due to very low patent application filing fees and a weak rigor in the examination 
process, whereas the reason for the backlog in EPO, the data source for this study, is a strategic filing behavior 
by inventors. According to this, applicants at the EPO aim to delay the grant date, in an effort to postpone high 
fees associated with translation, multiple validation and annual renewal fees based on which of the 35 national 
patent offices under EPO that applicants want their patent to be validated (Mejer and de la Potterie, 2011). 
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span of our database, we also need to consider the beginning of an overall increase in 
patenting activity in late 1980s.5 Hence, we restrict our analyses to start from 1990, and 
considering patent backlogs, as well as the evidence we provide below showing long periods 
between application and patent grant, we restrict our sample to the end of 2012 for most of 
our analyses.  
Some drawbacks of this dataset are explained below. First, the parsing, cleaning and 
matching processes in disambiguation of inventor names and applicant addresses carry 
some cases of mismatches across tables, due to name similarities, and address similarities, 
as well as multiplicity of addresses for distinct applicants. Second, in the underlying PatStat 
data, IPC concordances are not reported for a large portion of the original patent 
applications (about 20% in 2010/10 Patstat data). This issue propagates into the data we 
use. Another caveat is that after the latest update to the database, the patent application is 
associated with the last inventor/applicant of the patent. Finally, for the International 
Patent Classification (IPC) correspondences, we use the CLMN variable providing the IPC 
code in a fixed format, which allows capturing IPC classes in a more reliable manner, but it is 
specific to the database we are using6. This classification is not up-to-date with the IPC- 
NACE 2 concordance7.  
The ICT industry does not map directly to technology classes as they appear in patent 
documents. To extract patents that belong to ICT we need to rely on a concordance scheme 
which relates industries to relevant technological classes. To do so, we followed Palmberg 
and Martikainen (2006). They identify a set of technology classes that belong to the ICT 
industry. Indeed, their study was motivated by the goal of understanding the largest ICT 
operators’ technology diversification, across the broader ICT technology landscape. The 
“traditional” telecom category lists technologies that are backward compatible with the 
ISDN standard and circuit switching, whereas internet related telecom classes are 
technology classes with TCP/IP compatibility and packet-switching compatibility. 
Applications category relates to both traditional and internet-based telecom technology 
classes, and lays the foundations of the new generation smart phone technologies. We also 
include some “other” technology classes that feature technologies that span crucial patents 
to continue operating in ICT industry, using the most recent IPC v8 -NACE Rev 2 version 
(2014).  
Specifically, the IPC concordance used in determining which patent classes belong to which 
technology classes in our industry of interest, i.e. ICT industry, was based on the following 
table: 
                                                          
5 There is evidence suggesting that in many industries across different countries, patenting activity started to 
increase from mid-1980s, such as in semiconductors industry (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), along with an increase 
in patenting activity concentrated on electrical, electronics, computing, and scientific instruments industries 
(Hall, 2004), and overall in the United States (Kortum and Lerner, 1999), as well as in China (Hu and Jefferson, 
2009). 
6 The original table of the Patstat database for the CLMN variable is tls209_ipc_class_symbol. 
7 The most recent IPC v8 -NACE Rev 2 version is available here: https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/a/d1475596-
1568-408a-9191-426629047e31/2014-10-16-Final%20IPC_NACE2_2014.pdf 
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Table 1: IPC concordance 
Technology Categories Four-digit IPC Classes 
Traditional Telecom  
- Transmission 
- Switching 
- Voice Applications and Equipment 
- H04B, H01Q, H01P, H04J, G01R 
- H04Q, H01H 
- H04M, H94R, G10L 
Internet Related Telecom  
- Data and Internet Applications 
- Encrypting and Security 
- User Authentication and Access 
Control 
- G06F, H04L, G06N 
- H04K 
- G09F 
Applications  
- Pictorial Communication 
- Positioning  
- Games 
- Electronic Payment 
- Codecs and Algorithms 
- Machine to Machine 
- Photography 
- Mechanical Technologies 
- H04N 
- G01S 
- A63F 
- G07G 
- H03M, H03L 
- G08C 
- G03B 
- B23K, B29C, G06N, H05K, H01B, 
H01R, H02B, H02G 
Others  
- Impedance Networks 
- Pulse Technique 
- Broadcast Communication 
- Wireless Communication Networks 
- Recognition of Data 
- Image Data Processing 
- H03H 
- H03K 
- H04H 
- H04W 
- G06K 
- G06T 
 
Based on this classification, we use the four-digit technology class to search for patent 
applications in our database. There is variation across 5-digit technology classes within 
those 4 digit classes that we do not employ for the purposes of our analysis. Our universe of 
patents is solely based at the 4-digit technology class of the IPC class normalization of our 
database. Upon discussions of this scheme with practitioners from the industry, we also 
decided to demonstrate what happens when we take H04H and H04W classes out of the 
“Others” category. 
Finally, our data only reflects trends at the EU level and we do not know if these findings are 
generalizable to other jurisdictions. 
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4 DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE  
4.1 AGGREGATE TRENDS IN ICT 
According to our dataset, the number of patent filings increased from less than 10,000 per 
year in 1990 to over 33,000 in 2012. (See Figure 1). The growth rate of patent filings for the 
period under scrutiny is 5.6%. A more revealing statistic is how the growth of ICT patent 
filings compares to the general trend in patent filings. We know that patent applications 
have increased in all jurisdictions, at least until the early 2010s. Thus, the growth rate of ICT 
patent filings, while compelling, might simply reflect a general trend. Figure 2 addresses this 
question. It shows that the share of ICT patent filings over the total number of patent filings 
at the EPO has increased during the period under scrutiny, moving from around 15% in 1990 
to over 20% in 2012. We interpret this trend as an increasing relevance of ICT sector in the 
overall economy as well as an increasing patent propensity in that sector, rather than 
reflecting an overall increase in patenting across all fields. In our database, we observe a 
total of 3,130,489 patents filed in all technology classes, of which 582,664 belong to ICT 
patent classes as per Table 1. This figure is comparable to what Ozcan and Greenstein (2013) 
have found for the USPTO. They report that the 550,000 patents granted in the ICT 
equipment industry during the period 1976-2010 correspond to roughly 14% of all patenting 
activity in the United States. In our data, the share is higher but we also cover more recent 
years where ICT has exploded in terms of patenting. 
 
Figure 1: ICT patent filings at the EPO – 1990-2012 Figure 2: Share of ICT patent filings EPO – 1990-2012 
  
 
4.2 MAIN PATENTEES IN ICT 
Table 2 reports the top 20 ICT patent assignees during the period 1990-2012. All of these 
companies have filed more than 4,000 patents in the study period. The top 5 companies 
(Siemens, Samsung, Philipps, Qualcomm and IBM) have filed collectively over 56,000 
patents, which correspond to about 9.8% of all patent filings in ICT. Interestingly, the top 
assignees have changed over the years. Table 3 compares the top 5 assignees during the 
period 1996-2000 with top 5 assignees during period 2006-2010. As can be seen, Siemens, 
Philips, Matsushita, Nokia and Lucent have been replaced by Qualcomm, Samsung, Ericsson, 
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Huawei and LG. The new list suggests that over this timespan, Asian firms have become 
important players in the ICT sector. Also interesting to investigate is the evolution of the 
share of the total ICT patents that the top patent assignees received. In 1996-2000 period 
the top 5 assignees received a total of 11,408 patents out of 94,072 ICT patents. In the 2006-
2010 period instead, the top 5 assignees received 20,758 patents out of the total 164,524 
ICT patents assigned during the same period. This represent a slight increase in the share of 
patents received by the top 5 assignees in comparison to the total ICT world, from 12.1% to 
12.6%. 
Table 2: Top 20 ICT patentees at the EPO – 1990-2012 
Firm Number of patents 
SIEMENS 15786 
SAMSUNG 11629 
PHILIPS 10278 
QUALCOMM 9721 
IBM 9382 
ERICSSON 9246 
SONY 9229 
NOKIA 8408 
NEC 7782 
FUJITSU 7620 
MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC 7211 
MICROSOFT 5632 
CANON 5555 
LG ELECTRONICS 5253 
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES 4962 
THOMSON LICENSING 4664 
BLACKBERRY 4303 
TOSHIBA 4261 
ROBERT BOSCH 4240 
 
Table 3: Top 5 ICT patentees – 1996-2000 vs 2006-2010 
Firm Number of 
patents 
Top patentees 1996-2000 
SIEMENS 3122 
PHILIPS ELECTRONICS 2391 
MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL 2176 
NOKIA 1928 
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LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 1791 
 
Top patentees 2006-2010 
QUALCOMM 5155 
SAMSUNG 5047 
ERICSSON 4630 
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES 3144 
LG ELECTRONICS 2782 
 
In order to take a closer look at the emergence of new leaders in the patenting landscape of 
the ICT industry, we also analyze the increase and decrease in the patent applications by 
individual companies. For this, we take the total of patents applied for by all companies 
between 1996-2000, and compare these totals to those for the period 2006-2010.  Figure 3 
and Figure 4 contain the results of this analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Increase in patenting from 1996-2000 to 
2006-2010 
Figure 4: Decrease in patenting from 1996-2000 to 
2006-2010 
  
It is interesting to note that the five firms with the highest growth in patenting activity are 
also the ones with the highest amount of patent applications in 2006-2010 (Table 3). 
However, Matsushita Electric Industrial and Lucent Technologies are the only two 
companies that are among the companies with the largest drop in patent applications 
although being among the most active in patenting in 1996-2000. This also hints at some 
variation across different parts of the patenting landscape within the ICT industry, which we 
look at next.  
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4.3 PATENT CLASSES WITH THE HIGHEST GROWTH RATES 
In this section, we would like to draw attention to the concentration of patenting activity in 
different technology classes. Above we made a distinction between traditional and internet 
related telecom based on backward compatibility standards of TCP/IP for internet based 
telecom, and ISDN and circuit switching standards for traditional telecom (Palmberg and 
Martikainen, 2006). We start by looking across these larger technology categories and we 
then move to take a closer look into separate technology classes within those larger 
categories.  
Figure 5a: Patent Applications in Macro Categories  Figure 5b: Share of Macro Categories in total ICT 
patents applications 
  
The first thing to note is that the behavior of our data seems to confirm that the 
categorization of ICT patent technology classes in terms of traditional telecom, internet 
telecom, applications and others is meaningful. Figure 5a reports the total level of patenting 
activity of the macro categories; figure 5b categories exhibit a generally increasing trend 
starting from 1995. Starting from year 1998, there is a surge in patenting in internet related 
telecom technology classes. The divergence in patenting activity in traditional and internet 
telecom is clear especially from year 2000 onwards. Patenting activity in traditional telecom 
patent classes decline slightly in the early 2000s and the same happens in the internet 
related classes in the years of the tech bubble bust, but in this latter case the decline it is 
soon followed by a strong increase in activity. Patenting in the category “Others” starts to 
rise from mid 2000s onwards. The high level of patenting activity in the applications 
technology category in the early period arises from the more general applicability of some 
of the technology classes within it, like “photography” and 8 classes of “mechanical 
technologies”, as per Table 1.    
In order to better understand the jump in the “others” category, we take out H04H - 
Broadband Communications and H04W – Wireless Communications, and repeat our 
analysis. Once these two technology classes are taken out of “Others”, the remaining 
technology classes within that category show an almost linear trend over the study period 
as can be seen in Figure 6a. Indeed, the jump in patent applications that we observe in 
“Others” category emanates from the rise of patenting activity in these two relatively 
nascent technology fields. These two technology classes make up a very small part of ICT 
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patents in the earlier part of our study, as can be seen in Figure 6b below, but this is 
followed by a large increase to almost 15% in the later part of the study.  
 
Figure 6a: Patent Applications in Macro Categories with 
H04H and H04W Separated 
Figure 6b: Share of Macro Categories and H04H-H04W in 
total ICT patents applications 
  
Figure 6c: Share of Macro Categories in Total ICT 
Applications in 1995 and 2012 
Figure 6d: Share of Macro Categories and H04H-H04W in 
Total ICT patents applications in 1995 and 2012 
  
 
In Figure 6c, we report two slices out of Figures 5b to contrast the changes in the categories 
from the earlier part of our sample to the later part. In Figure 6d we take out the H04W and 
H04H categories out of the “Other” category and repeat the exercise. Indeed, H04W and 
H04H had a very small presence in the database in the earlier part of the study period. 
 
For the period 1990-2012, we look at the three technology classes with the highest number 
of patent applications among ICT technology classes. In table 4, we observe that three of the 
thirty-seven technology classes that we look into, make up almost 40% of 582,664 patent 
filings within ICT. Electric digital data processing (G06F) is a central technology field where 
ICT firms patent heavily. Within this class, about 14.1% of patent applications have been 
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filed by the top 5 assignees. Transmission of digital information (H04L) is another IPC class 
code within the larger category of data and internet applications under internet related 
telecom technology field. The top 5 firms for patent applications in this class represent 
18.8% of all patent applications in the class. The concentration of patenting activity in these 
two subclasses within an internet related telecom technology field indicates the growing 
importance of patenting activity in new generation technologies, especially in the aftermath 
of the introduction of TCP/IP protocol and data transmission requirements for ICT firms. 
Pictorial communications (H04N) is the subclass of Applications technology category with 
the highest patenting activity, and the firms in the top 5 of patent applications for Pictorial 
Communications patents make up about 25.4% of all patent applications in the class. Firms 
with the highest patenting activity in all three fields are large incumbents. Siemens AG 
appears in top 5 within both electric digital data processing and transmission of digital 
information, while Philips NV appears both in electric digital data processing and pictorial 
communication. All of these firms also appear on the list of top 20 firms with the most 
patenting activity.    
 
 
Table 4: Top patentees in different patent classes, 1990-2012 
Firm  Firm patents  Patent Class Total 
G06F - Electric Digital Data Processing  
IBM  4689  99648  
MICROSOFT  3649  99648 
PHILIPS  1949  99648  
SIEMENS  1927  99648 
FUJITSU 1869 99648 
H04L - Transmission of Digital Information  
ERICSSON  4010  69386 
QUALCOMM  2572  69386  
SIEMENS 2384 69386 
HUAWEI  2218  69386 
NOKIA  1885  69386 
H04N - Pictorial Communication  
SONY 3468 51508 
SAMSUNG  2667  51508  
PHILIPS  2435  51508 
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CANON 2301 51508  
THOMSON  2216  51508 
 
The introduction of third generation telephones and the technologies that are necessary to 
support them should most probably be the reason for the increase in patenting activity in 
data and internet applications subfield. Taking a closer look at our data, we indeed observe 
a drastic increase in patenting activity in the second half of our study period. Figure 7 
reports the 10 patent classes with the highest level of patenting activity in the period 1990-
2000 and their corresponding level of patenting activity in the period 2001-2012. Figure 8 
does the same for the second part of the study period. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Evolution of patenting from 1990-2000 to 
2001-2010 for the main ICT classes in 1990-2000 
Figure 8:  Evolution of patenting from 1990-2000 to 
2001-2010 for the main ICT classes in 2001-2012 
  
Patent applications in GO6F and H04L demonstrate a big jump across the two time periods, 
in line with the above interpretation of the emergence of internet technologies on portable 
telecommunications devices. Interestingly, both G06F and H04L are already very important 
in the 1990-2000 period, with G06F being the leading technology class, and H04L coming in 
third, only after H04N. In the second part of our study period, these two technology 
subclasses emerge clearly at the epicenter of the patenting landscape, but other fields also 
show increased patenting activity. H04W, Wireless Communication Networks, appears in 
the chart as the technology class with the fourth highest patenting activity, although it does 
not appear in the earlier period.  
Figure 9: % Increase in patenting from 1996-2000 to 
2006-2010 
Figure 10: % Decrease in patenting from 1996-2000 to 
2006-2010 
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The above interpretation of the general trend in patenting activity is also reflected in a 
breakdown of the 37 classes in terms of those showing the largest increase and decrease in 
patenting. Figure 9 lists the 10 patent classes with the highest increase in patenting activity 
calculated by comparing the period 1996-2000 to the period 2006-2010. Figure 10 does the 
same for the 10 patent classes with the highest decrease (or lowest increase). Four of the 
five internet related telecom technology classes are among the 10 technology classes with 
highest increase, whereas among the 5 technology classes with decreasing patent 
applications, two classes, H04Q and H01P, are related to traditional telecom technologies.  
Based on the trends we have described so far, we note that some patent classes are 
consistently more important in the ICT industry. Table 5 lists the names of these classes, and 
in what follows, when looking at other trends, we pay special attention to these patent 
classes, which we henceforth refer to as the main ICT technology classes.  
Table 5 – Main ICT Technology Classes 
G06F  Electric Digital Data Processing  
H04N  Pictorial Communication (e.g. Television)  
H04L  Transmission of Digital Information  
H04B  Transmission (transmission of information carrying 
signals)  
H04Q  Selecting  
B29C  Shaping or Joining of Plastics…  
H01R  Electrically-Conductive Connections…  
G06K  Recognition of Data; Presentation of Data; Record 
Carriers; Handling Record Carriers  
H04M  Telephonic Communication  
H04W  Wireless Communication Networks  
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4.4 CONCENTRATION OF PATENTEES ACROSS PATENT CLASSES 
Besides the variation of patenting activity across technology classes, the concentration of 
the number of patentees also changes across patent classes. As already noted in some of 
the tables above, some technology classes have a larger amount of the patenting activity 
carried out by a smaller number of firms. Delving into this, we look at patentee 
concentration within the four macro categories. 
Figure 11a: Concentration of Patenting Activity 4 
Main ICT Categories 
Figure 11b: Concentration of Patenting Activity 4 Main 
ICT Categories with H04H and H04W Separated 
  
 
Figure 11a shows the changing levels of concentration for each macro category over time. 
Patenting activity in internet telecom starts off highly concentrated within the hands of the 
top 10 firms, but the patenting activity in that category is then picked up by other firms as 
well, and becomes diluted. Traditional telecom demonstrates a persistent level of 
concentration of patenting activity over the period of our study. Applications technology 
classes are subject to lower concentration at generally around 20% of patenting activity 
carried out by the top 10 patenting firms over our study period. Others category shows a 
trend similar to internet telecom, with patenting activity dominated by the top firms in the 
first years of our study.  This activity then dissipates, but again becomes consolidated 
towards the end of the study period, whereby it has the largest concentration among the 
four main categories.  
After observing the concentration of patent activity in our 4 main categories, we repeat the 
exercise we carried out in Figures 5b and 6b, and take a look at what happens when we 
treat H04H and H04W as a separate category, instead of within the broad category of 
“Others”. We interpret Figure 11b as supporting our earlier observation that these two are 
nascent technology classes, since these two technology classes present radical changes in 
the concentration of patenting activity, with new actors showing up in the patenting scene 
for these classes, but quickly moving out to give the big jump we observe in the top 
unbroken-line. The growing number of patent applications does not bring the concentration 
ratio to the levels of the other main categories within our observation period, a trait we 
interpret as indicative of the emergent nature of these technologies, and the dominance of 
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few players with large commitments and investments in these technology classes of 
broadband communications and wireless communication networks. When H04H and H04W 
are taken out, the rest of the “Others” category presents a decline in the concentration of 
patenting activity.    
In order to understand the underlying dynamics of the concentration of patenting activity, 
we also look at the classes with highest concentration in Figure 12. Electronic payment, 
G07G, demonstrates the highest concentration, with a technology class of emerging 
importance, Wireless Communications Networks (H04W) following closely behind. 
Photography, G03B, also demonstrates very high concentration of patenting activity. 
Switchgear for distribution of electrical power (H02B), and games (A63F), also demonstrate 
high concentration. Next, for these five classes, we also look at whether the concentration 
of patenting activity persists over time or is driven by some consolidation at the beginning 
of the study period or towards the end, hinting at possible consolidation of innovative 
potential in some key actors. Note, however that there was very little patenting activity in 
the first half of our study period for H04W, Wireless Communication Networks, a technology 
that rose to central importance in the second half of the study period.   
 
 
Figure 12: Patent Classes with higher 
concentration of patenting activity 
Figure 13: Concentration of Patenting Activity in 
Classes with High Concentration– Share of Patenting 
by Top 5 Firms 
  
As can be seen from Figure 13, most of these patent classes demonstrate very high 
concentration until 2001, a point in which some patent classes experience a sharp decline in 
concentration. After 2001 the concentration for the most concentrated patent classes 
remains below 50% for the majority of the remaining timeframe. An exception is the 
electronic payment class (G07G) in our main category of “Applications” which has more 
than 60% of the patenting activity done by the top 5 firms at the end of our study period. 
Figure 14: Concentration in Main Patent Classes  Figure 15: Concentration in Main Patent Classes 
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In Figure 14, we present the concentration of patenting activity for the main ICT patent 
classes as indicated in Table 5. We note that B29C has the lowest concentration, whereas 
H04W has the highest concentration. The patenting activity in H04W is relatively more 
concentrated than those of the other classes, but all the main ICT technology classes with 
the exception of B29C – Shaping or Joining of Plastics, have at least 10% of the patenting 
activity in that class carried out by the top 5 patentees. We then trace the concentration of 
patenting activity for five of these main technology classes (G06F, H04L, H04N, H04B, B29C) 
over time, to see if there are visible time trends. Indeed in Figure 15, we can see a general 
downward trend in concentration in all classes except B29C. B29C has traditionally a lower 
concentration than the other four technology classes, and the share of the top 5 patentees 
in this class only peaks 10% by the end of the timeframe. Three of these classes had their 
concentration first plateau at around 20% of the patenting carried out by top 5 firms, upon 
which H04B and H04L climbed up to a similar concentration level as H04N. The 
concentration in these five classes is generally below those of higher concentration classes 
(Figure 12).   
 
4.5 FRAGMENTATION 
In this section we examine the level of fragmentation of the ownership rights in the ICT 
domain by using two proxies: The number of citation of prior art (other patents) contained 
in each patent application, and the number of different owners to which the patents cited in 
the application belong. The assumption is that the higher is the number of patents cited in 
the application and the higher is the number of owners to which the cited patents belong, 
the more fragmented the patent field is. Patent applicants in this case will have a harder 
time developing innovations without infringing rights held by others. Citations based 
measures have been used to operationalize fragmentation in innovation strategy literature 
before (Ziedonis, 2004).  
Figure 16a lists the average number of citations contained in applications for patents in ICT 
technology categories. The general trend is positive across virtually all main categories. 
Besides the overall increase in patent citations, the “others” category features a jump 
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around year 2001, but then fits back into the general trend. While traditional telecom and 
applications show some decline in citations in late 1990s, the internet telecom category 
shows a more monotonical increase up to 2004. Around about year 2005 all patents have 
decreasing amount of citations. This is probably due to the timespan of our database. If less 
controversial patents (low number of citations, low number of owners of patents cited) are 
granted faster, then they enter the database earlier than the rest of the applications. 
Another explanation could be a change in the patenting strategy of applicants, which 
significantly affects applicants’ patent portfolios (Blind et al., 2009). There is evidence 
suggesting a positive link between the number of citations made in patents, with the 
number of litigation cases (Lim, 2014; Pwc Litigation Study, 2016). If patent applicants have 
internalized this information they might be purposefully reduce the number of citations in 
patents. In section 5, we test for the first of these two explanations. The differences 
between 1995-2005, as well as the similar trends across the other years require further and 
more fine-grained analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16a: Number of Citations per Patent 
Application 
Figure 16b: Number of Citations per Patent 
Application with H04W-H04H Separated 
  
 
In order to take a closer look at the curious nature of the jump in the applications category, 
we take out the two classes of H04H and H04W out of “Others” category and take a look at 
the citations in patent applications once again. It seems that not only these two technology 
classes (i.e. Broadband Communications and Wireless Communication Networks) are 
nascent and characterized by high concentration of patenting activity in few actors, but also 
these patent applications have very large numbers of citations compared to other main 
categories, thereby explaining the jump in Figure 16a. Once H04H and H04W are taken out, 
the remaining four main categories broadly fit the same similar trend, as was observed in 
Figure 16a as well.  
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In Figure 17, we report patent classes with the most citations. Patents in two patent classes, 
H04K – Encrypting and securing, and A63F – Games, make more than 30 citations on 
average but all the patent classes listed exceed the 20 citations per patent application 
threshold.  
Although at this level of detail we observe the technology classes with patents that have the 
most citations on average, looking into time trends within these classes may help to 
understand the fragmentation issue better. For this purpose, Figure 18 plots the top 5 most 
citing technology classes over time. Here we take a closer look at H04K, A63F, G06K, G06F 
and G10L. The big “jump” in patent citations by H04K is due to the extremely low number of 
patent applications in that class in that year (17 in total) and to the presence of huge outlier, 
a patent from First Data Corp containing 1609 citations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Classes with Most Citations Figure 18: Classes with most citations 
  
 
Figure 19: Average number of Citations in Most 
Important Classes 
Figure 20: Trend in Citations in Most Important 
Classes 
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Figure 19 shows the patent citations made by applicants in the patent technology classes 
that are deemed to be the most important during our study period, based on our earlier 
analyses (see Figure 7 and Figure 8). Thus, here we draw attention to the patent citations 
made by applicants in those main patent classes. The classes with the most patent 
applications, and the highest increase in patent citations, also feature four of the most citing 
technology classes, namely G06K, G06F, B29C, H04B. Next, we take a closer look at the five 
most important classes over time (figure 20). For the most part of the period of study, the 
patent citations are on similar trends, with a general increase to above 20 citations in patent 
applications on average, from late 1990s onwards. Among the five most important 
technology classes, G06F – Data and Internet Applications is the only class reaches a peak of 
more than 30 citations made per patent application.  
Although informative about the fragmentation of the knowledge within patent classes and 
the influence of earlier patents on later patents, patent citations may be made to the 
patents of the applicant (self-citations), or they can be made to patents owned by very few 
companies. If that is the case, an increasing amount of citations, would not necessarily imply 
a fragmentation of knowledge and intellectual property rights within the field. In order to 
understand whether this is the case, we also look at the average number of owners of the 
cited patents. In other words, we look at how many different owners the patents cited in 
patent applications belong.  
As can be seen in Figure 21, the overall trend is decreasing from 2005 onwards, and as such, 
reflects the same trend as in Figure 16a. In figure 21, we refer to the four main technology 
categories, and observe that traditional and internet telecom have consistently had a higher 
dispersion of ownership in the technology cited than the two remaining categories. Indeed, 
traditional telecom and internet telecom have also been on similar trends starting from mid-
1990s. We interpret this as evidence that these two main classes involved more complex 
property rights. We further interpret the slightly more complex ownership of citations of 
internet telecom patents, as compared to traditional telecom as well as to the other two 
main categories, as evidence that patents in internet telecom are subject to the highest 
level of fragmentation. 
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In Figure 22 we plot the classes with the highest number of owners in their citations. H04K 
and H04Q are clear outliers, with citations to 8 different owners on average made in patent 
applications in these classes. For the top 5 technology classes in that plot, we also 
demonstrate the change in the average number of owners of cited patents over time in 
figure 23. Besides a general trend of increases up to 1997, and then decreasing until the end 
of the study period, H04K is the only technology class showing a slightly different pattern of 
patent citations to patents with an increasing number of firms at first, and then decreasing, 
only to make a big jump in late 1990s. Overall, the patent classes making the most citations 
to other patents, cite patents that belong to more than 5 owners.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Classes with most different owners 
cited 
Figure 23: Classes with most different owners cited 
  
 
Figure 21: Dispersion of Ownership in Citations 
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We also look at the number of owners of the cited patents in the technology classes that we 
deem to be the most important, due to the concentration and increase of patenting activity 
in those classes over the study period, in Figure 24. Compared to the technology classes 
citing patents with the highest number of owners in Figure 22, it seems that the most 
important five classes have a higher concentration of ownership in citations made. This is 
despite the fact that these five classes cite about as many patents (about 20 citations per 
patent application on average) as the classes with the highest dispersion of ownership (see 
Figure 19). We interpret this as evidence that the patent classes deemed to be the most 
important have less fragmentation compared to other technology classes. This is because, 
patent applications in these technology classes cite about as many patents, but these 
patents belong to a much smaller number of firms. 
 
 
Figure 24: Average Number of Owners Cited in 
Most Important Classes 
Figure 25: Average Number of Owners Cited in 
Important Technology Classes 
  
 
In Figure 25, we also trace the average number of owners cited in the most important 
technology classes. The most striking case is B29C as the technology cited in applications in 
this class belongs to a very low number of different owners. On the contrary patent 
applications in H04L cites patents with more owners. Patent applications in the other three 
most important classes have an average of 4-7 different owners in their citations throughout 
the study period. 
4.6 PATENT DELAYS 
In this section, we consider another issue that has generated attention by scholars working 
on innovation strategy in our sample. For 212,168 applications with application dates, grant 
dates, and ICT classes available, we look at the average time from application to grant for 
applications for patents granted in different years (Figure 26), and patents granted in 
different technology classes (Figure 27).  
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Figure 26: Average Time to grant for ICT patents 
granted in years 1980-2014 
Figure 27: Average Time to Grant for Patents 
Granted in ICT Technology Classes 
  
 
Overall we see a general increase in the time to grant, with the increase picking up in late 
80s, and with a renewed increase starting from early 2000s. Patents granted in 2013 had on 
average a lag of more than 6 years. For patent classes with patent application date and 
patent grant date available, we observe quite a bit of variation across their time to grant. 
Applicants of patents for H04Q - Selecting (switches and relay for signals), H04J – Multiplex 
Communication, Jamming of/Secret Communication - H04K and H04H – Broadcast 
Communication had to wait longer than 6 years on average to receive their patents. 
4.7 PATENT QUALITY 
In this section we report the trend in patent quality between 1990 and 2012 for both the 
total ICT sector (Figure 28 & 30) and for the macro categories ICT (Figure 29 & 31). Following 
previous literature (e.g. Trajtenberg, 1990; Neuhäusler et al., 2015) we evaluate patent 
quality using the forward citations received by the patents. In particular, we calculate two 
proxies that allow us to evaluate patent quality in the ICT sector in relative terms, by 
comparing it to the patent quality of the entire utility patent universe. The choice of this 
approach is dictated by the timespan of the sample, the truncation of the database in 2014, 
and the descriptive nature of the analysis that does not allow for the inclusion of year 
controls8. 
Our first proxy is the share of granted ICT patents that receive zero citations in comparison 
to the same share for the utility patent universe9. Figure 29 and 30 contain the results of 
this analysis. Figure 29 shows that relative patent quality has been higher in the ICT sector 
even though it has deteriorated significantly in recent years. Up until 2005 in fact, the share 
of ICT patents receiving zero citation has been 50% lower than the corresponding share for 
the entire patent universe. Nevertheless the situation has changed considerably since then 
                                                          
8 Looking at the citations received by patents in the ICT world in the absolute term would lead to misleading 
conclusions, as patent granted in later years have less time for being cited. The result of the analysis would 
therefore show an artificial decrease in the level of quality. On the contrary the only assumption behind our 
approach is that the timing of the citation for patents in ICT and the timing of citations for patents in the rest 
of the utility categories is similar.  
9 (% of ICT patents with 0 citations/ % of utility patents with 0 citations) - 1  
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and by 2012 the same share is only 10% lower. Figure 29 shows that the trend is shared by 
the four macro categories. There doesn’t seem to be any significant difference in terms of 
average level of quality between them.  
 
 
Figure 28: Share of patents with 0 citations 1990-
2012 relative comparison ICT-total patent universe 
Figure 29: Share of patents with 0 citations 1990-
2012 relative comparison macro cat.-tot. patent  
   
 
Our second proxy is the number of citations received by ICT patents relative to the number 
of citations received by the average utility patent10. Figure 30 and 31 report the result of the 
analyses. Consistent with the results previously obtained, figure 30 shows that ICT patents 
have lost ground in terms of quality in comparison to the average utility patent. In 1995 in 
fact ICT patents received 75% more citations than the average patent. By contrast in 2012 
ICT patents receive only 40% more citations. Figure 31 reports the trend for the macro 
categories. It is possible to see that the sharpest decline has been suffered by the internet 
telecom category that passes from receiving 150% more citation in 1995 to receiving 80% 
more citations in 2012. Also the traditional telecom category, while stable for most of the 
timeframe, experienced a decline toward the end and by 2012 is less cited than average 
utility patents. The only category exhibiting an increase in citations is the residual category 
“other” which experienced an increase in citations received starting from 2007.  
  
Figure 30: Citations per patent 1990-2012 relative 
comparison ICT-total patent universe 
Figure 31: Citations per patent 1990-2012 relative 
comparison macro categories-total patent 
universe 
                                                          
10 (Citations per patent ICT/ Citations per patent all utility) - 1 
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An important disclaimer is due at this point. We do not observe directly patent quality. We proxy 
quality with some measures that have been used in the literature, but they are far from being a 
perfect characterization of the underlying construct. So, our conclusions about patent quality should 
be interpreted with caution. 
4.8 CONSOLIDATION IN ICT 
Our interpretation of the above analyses suggests that ICT sector has demonstrated a 
growing level of fragmentation from 1990s, until the end of late 2010s. More recent years of 
our patent database suffers from problems outlined in the previous sections, mainly patent 
applications take a long time to process, and the rights associated with patents become 
increasingly complicated over time. Industry insiders suggest that this is also paralleled by a 
consolidation of firm ownership11. In order to take a look at this phenomenon, we trace the 
ICT patents of 6 of the important network equipment makers, after the emergence of 
smartphones. For each of the six firms, we first check the number of patents they had in 
that year, after getting rid of multiple observations for the same entity within our database. 
Throughout the 2007-2012, Alcatel-Lucent has a growing patent portfolio, while Ericsson 
has a persistently dominant position in ICT patents. Huawei and Nokia have a big presence 
in patenting activity, although Nokia shows some relative decline starting from 2011, a trend 
also observed for ZTE. Nortel Networks falls from the patenting scene by late 2010, and the 
reason is indeed that the company filed for bankruptcy in early 2009, and later started 
selling its patents in large deals.12 
Figure 32: Patents of ICT Vendors 2007-2012 Figure 33: Patent counts of vendors, time trend 
                                                          
11 “Can Nordic rivals stop the Chinese juggernaut?”Kochhar R., TelecomsTech. Accessed, April 3,2017. 
Available:  https://www.telecomstechnews.com/news/2016/aug/23/opinion-can-nordic-rivals-stop-chinese-
juggernaut/ 
12 “Nortel $4.5-Billion Patent Sale to Apple, Microsoft, Others Approved”, Brickley, P. WSJ. 2011. Accessed, 
April 3, 2017. Available at: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303812104576440161959082234 
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Table 6. Patent Stocks and Ranking of Patent Stocks within ICT for 2007-2012 
 Alcatel-Lucent Ericsson Huawei 
Year Patents ICT Rank Patents ICT Rank Patents ICT Rank 
2007 152 35 780 3 658 4 
2008 193 25 1.226 1 786 4 
2009 281 19 1.046 2 690 3 
2010 603 6 1122 1 477 9 
2011 667 6 1.035 1 772 4 
2012 741 2 616 3 582 4 
 Nokia Nortel ZTE 
 Patents ICT Rank Patents ICT Rank Patents ICT Rank 
2007 543 6 67 61 141 37 
2008 366 13 56 67 196 24 
2009 352 15 103 41 465 8 
2010 406 12 38 92 1040 3 
2011 355 13 1 6714 540 9 
2012 118 30   122 29 
 
 
5 ON THE DETERMINANTS OF PATENT DELAYS 
5.1 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
In this section we estimate the effect of different patent characteristics on the length of the 
timespan between patent application and patent granting. We cautiously interpret this 
effect as correlation rather than causation. We also acknowledge that our findings below 
might not straightforwardly generalize to other industrial settings.  
To accomplish this aim we form a sample of 170,776 ICT patent applications, which covers 
the period between 1990 and 2012. Our analysis considers the effect of: the type of 
technology contained in the patent application, the fragmentation in the technological field 
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of application, the patenting intensity in the technological field of application as well as that 
of the country of origin of a firm, the experience the firm has with the patent application 
process, and the value of the innovation.  
Our dependent variable is the time span between patent application and patent granting 
expressed in years. We proxy for the technology contained in the patent through dummy 
variables that capture four ICT macro technological categories, where the omitted category 
is traditional telecom as per Figure 1. We proxy for fragmentation in the technological field 
of application with both the number of citations contained in the patent application, and 
the number of different owners to which the patents cited in the application belong. We 
proxy for the patenting intensity in the patent class with the total number of patents filed in 
the IPC class of the patent in the year. We proxy for the patenting intensity of the country of 
the organization with the total number of patents filed by firms with the legal residence in 
the country of the organization in the year. We proxy for the experience of the organization 
with the patenting process with the total number of patents filed by the firm in the year. We 
proxy for the value of the innovation contained in the patent application with both: the total 
number of claims contained in the patent application, and the number of citations received 
by the patent in the years following patent grant. Except for the dependent variable and the 
dummy variables, we take the logarithm of all the variables in the sample to prevent 
extreme observations from significantly influencing the results. 
To evaluate the effect of the variables described on patent delays we estimate a series of 
regressions that include both year and country controls. Year controls should capture 
temporary trends in the global patenting behavior that might be correlated with some of 
our variables of interest. Country controls should instead account for the specificities of 
different patent offices (e.g. the level of staffing) that might significantly influence the lag 
between application and grant. Further, we cluster the standard errors in the estimation by 
country of application to take into account the possible autocorrelation of the error term 
between country and across patent applications.  
Table 7 contains the descriptive statistics about the patents in the sample. We report the 
raw values of the variables (i.e. not the logarithms) to give a better sense of the distribution 
of the data.  About 28% of the patents belong to “Traditional Telecom” macro ICT category, 
26% to the “Internet Telecom” category, 35% to the “Applications” category, and 11% to the 
residual category. On average, each patent application contains 23 citations of patents that 
belong to 4.5 different owners. The IPC technological fields considered in the analysis 
receive on average 591 patent applications each for all the years included in the sample. By 
contrast, the countries of origin of the firms included in the sample receive on average 1,283 
patent applications each year. The firms to which the patent applications belong make on 
average 48 patent applications each year. Finally, on average each patent application 
contains 13 claims of originality and receives 17 citations from other patents after it is 
granted.  
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 
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Table 8 contains the correlations among the variables in the sample. As expected, the 
variables that are proxies for the same construct are generally positively correlated. For 
example, the correlation between the citations contained in a patent application and the 
number of different owners of the technology cited is 0.68, while the correlation between 
the number of claims and the number of citations received is 0.14. For what concerns the 
relationship between patent delays and the independent variables, the highest correlation is 
the positive 0.23 with the number of applications from the country of origin of the 
organization filing for the patent belongs. 
 
 
Table 8: Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Appl. lag 1           
2 Internet Telecom 0.06 1          
3 Applications – Telecom -0.10 -0.44 1         
4 Other - Telecom -0.02 -0.21 -0.26 1        
5 Citations Made 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.00 1       
6 Owner of tech. cited 0.08 0.05 -0.07 0.02 0.68 1      
7 N. Class applications 0.10 0.68 -0.25 -0.23 0.04 0.10 1     
8 N. Country applications 0.23 0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.10 0.10 0.10 1    
9 Firm applications 0.04 0.08 -0.17 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.18 -0.02 1   
Variable N Mean Min Max SD p25 p50 p75 p95 
          
       Appl lag 170776 5.47 0.67 21.27 2.40 3.66 5.15 6.82 9.94 
       Internet-Telecom 170776 0.26 0 1 0.44 0 0 1 1 
       Applications-Telecom 170776 0.35 0 1 0.48 0 0 1 1 
       Other-Telecom 170776 0.11 0 1 0.31 0 0 0 1 
        
        Citations Made 170776 23.36 1 4685 43.92 9 15 25 61 
        Owners of tech. cited 170776 4.59 1 154 4.62 2 3 6 12 
        N. Class applications 170776 591.04 1 1903 486.38 214 422 887 1747 
        N. Country applications 170776 1283.18 0 3023 870 399.8452 1407 1927 2748 
        Firm applications 170776 48.25 0.08 393.83 78.55 2 9 59.5 225 
        N. Claims 170776 12.69 0 171 8.80 7 11 16 29 
        Citations received 170776 16.75 0 3041 37.00 2 7 18 62 
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10 N. Claims 0.04 0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.04 0.04 1  
11 Citations received 0.16 0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.28 0.24 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.14 1 
 
5.2 RESULTS 
Table 9 contains the results from regression analysis. Except for the dummy variables 
capturing the macro technological categories, we first test the effect of each independent 
variable in isolation and then in a full model that includes the rest of the independent 
variables of the analysis.  
Model 1, we regress patent delays on the type of technology contained in the patent 
application on patent delays. As one can see, relative to patents in the “Traditional 
Telecom” macro category, patents in the “Applications” category take about half a year less 
to be granted (-0.463; p<0.01), patents in the residual category “Other” take about 38 days 
less than patent applications in Traditional Telecom (-0.104; p<0.05), while the difference 
between “Traditional Telecom” patents and “Internet Telecom” patents is not significant. 
Model 2 through Model 8 separately estimate the effect of our independent variables on 
patent delays. Model 2 tests the effect of the number of citations contained in the patent 
application (0.066; p<0.01), while Model 3 tests the effect of the number of different 
owners of the technology cited (0.277; p<0.01). As expected, both variables are significant 
and positively related with the lag between application and grant. Model 4 tests the effect 
of the total number of applications in the year in the IPC technology class of the patent 
application. The effect is positive and significant (0.115, p<0.01). Model 5 tests the effect of 
the number of applications from the country of the organization filing for the patent in the 
year. The effect is not significant. Model 6 tests the effect of the number of patent 
applications from the firm filing for the patent in the year. The effect is not significant. 
Model 7 and Model 8 test the effect of the number of patent claims and the number of 
forward citations received by the patent from later patent applications. Both effects are 
statistically insignificant. Finally, Model 9 tests all the independent variables together. The 
main difference in the results is that coefficients for the “Other” dummy and the number of 
citations contained in patents become insignificant while value, as measured by the number 
of patent claims, has a negative effect in the full model on the patent lag (-0.030; p<0.05).   
The results indicate that patent applications filed in applications category has consistently 
lower time to grant, compared to the other three categories, as Internet related telecom 
and other categories do not have a statistically significant difference in terms of time to 
grant compared to traditional telecom. It also seems that every other claim in a patent 
application decreases the time to grant by 11 days. Although significant only at 10% 
confidence level, the total number of applications in a technology class also seems to 
increase patent delays, after accounting for country and year differences. More 
interestingly, we interpret the consistently positive and significant variable for owner of 
technology cited as evidence that fragmentation of technology classes increases patent 
delays. Though we are cautious of the fact that our second operationalization of 
fragmentation, i.e. the number of citations made in the patent application, is negative and 
insignificant.  
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Table 9: Regressions on the lag between patent application and grant 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Internet Telecom 0.082        0.034 
 (0.063)        (0.045) 
Applications-Telecom -0.463**        -0.476** 
 (0.085)        (0.106) 
Other-Telecom -0.104*        -0.110 
 (0.048)        (0.070) 
Citations Made  0.066**       -0.097 
  (0.025)       (0.073) 
Owner of tech. cited   0.277**      0.396** 
   (0.010)      (0.049) 
N. Class applications    0.115**     0.053+ 
    (0.022)     (0.027) 
N. Country applications     0.147    0.158 
     (0.142)    (0.147) 
Firm applications      -0.004   -0.047 
      (0.040)   (0.043) 
N. Claims       0.009  -0.030* 
       (0.026)  (0.014) 
Citation Received        0.010 -0.049 
        (0.040) (0.051) 
Intercept  4.450** 4.168** 3.957** 3.706** 4.119** 4.356** 4.328** 4.335** 3.830** 
 (0.048) (0.072) (0.013) (0.126) (0.228) (0.029) (0.070) (0.074) (0.340) 
          
N 170776 170776 170776 170776 170776 170776 170776 170776 170776 
adj. R-sq 0.204 0.196 0.200 0.197 0.196 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.211 
 
Significant at: ** 0.01 level; * 0.05 level; + 0.1 level 
6 CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
This report provides a description of patenting activity in ICT in Europe between 1990 and 
2012. We use data on patent filings at the EPO to develop our analysis. While it is a narrow 
focus, on a specific jurisdiction, for a restricted period of time and on a part of the whole ICT 
industry, we believe that our findings are interesting and relevant. We find some consistent 
patterns: 1. Patent filings have increased threefold during the study period and ICT accounts 
for a larger share of all patent filings, from 15% to over 20%; 2. Patent delays in the ICT 
industry have increased significantly during the study period, by 2012 it takes an average of 
6 years to ICT patents to go from application to grant; 3. The quality of ICT patents relative 
to the quality of other patents has declined over the years, as measured by the number of 
citations or by the number of patents without any citation (low quality patents); 4. Two 
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technology classes have emerged as central in the ICT landscape starting from the mid 
2000s: H04H - Broadband Communications and H04W – Wireless Communications; these 
two technology classes also show some different patterns in terms of concentration, 
citations and other aspects; 5. There is a surge in patenting activity by new players in recent 
years especially Asian firms. 6. Fragmentation of patent landscape, as measured by the 
number of citations made by each patent or the number of owners of cited patents, has 
increased up to the mid 2000s and then declined, the latter effect possibly due to data 
issues (truncation). 
We then look more carefully at the relationship between patent delays and some 
characteristics of the patent. Patent delays are especially problematic because they make 
the system more uncertain and create additional frictions and costs. It has been shown that 
patent delays penalize predominantly small innovative companies. Our results show that 
patent delays are relatively shorter in the Applications category. Patent delays tend to 
increase if patents have made lots of citations or cite patents belonging to many different 
owners. Of the two, it is the latter dimension that has most of the explanatory power in the 
regressions. This suggests that fragmentation of the patent landscape increases patent 
delays. Finally, more valuable patents, i.e. with more claims, tend to have shorter delays, 
which is consistent with previous findings. 
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